Matthew Hornak

November 17, 2021

Section I: Introduction

In his 2013 defense of Henry Kissinger’s realist foreign policy, author and international relations scholar Robert Kaplan invoked the works of Portuguese existentialist poet Fernando Pessoa, who noted that the artist and intellectual often cannot accept the bone-chilling harshness of reality, and that their work often “serves as an outlet for the sensitivity [that] action had to leave behind”^[i].

Pessoa’s observation pierces the heart of a decades-old dilemma that faces every ambitious statesman and diplomat-in-training: Can the sensitivities of morality be reconciled with the unforgiving and oftentimes chaotic nature of politics and diplomacy? Can one afford to care about intensely human problems while working in a profession that views human issues in terms of national power? In its simplest terms, is caring possible anymore?

The answer ought to be an emphatic yes–the institutions that serve states are human institutions after all, and the care for one’s fellow man is often at the heart of the way in which we conceive basic moral principles^[ii]. But Kaplan references Pessoa’s observation in an article on Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for a reason: it is exceptionally easy to look past atrocities and the occasional human rights violation if it is in service of some greater material or security priority, as Kissinger is often blamed of having done in numerous nations^[iii]. Thus, the answer to this existential dilemma in international relations is much, much murkier. But a consultation as to why nations forge relationships with one another reveals that the hope of genuine care is the source, and not the antithesis, of the national power diplomats like Kissinger have long sought after.

Section II: National Power as the life-force of a Nation-State

The “unforgiving and often times chaotic nature of statecraft” is, putting it lightly, an understatement. In 1989, the Berlin Wall–the defining symbol of the Iron Curtain–only fell after an East German mistakenly declared that immigration to West Germany was to be effective immediately and without requisites, giving East Germany little time to prepare for the mass arrival of East Berliners to the border^iv. In another case of incidental events turning into a political disaster, French, British, and Israeli officials met in secret to formulate a plan to overthrow Egyptian dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser’s government in 1956, resulting in the Suez Crisis. In fact, the operation was such a spectacular failure that the US vehemently denounced its three closest allies not only publicly, but on the floor of the United Nations General Assembly^[iv]. More recently, in August 2021, 39 nations (including the United States) took part in the airlift of nearly 82,300 Afghan refugees over the course of 11 days, as the Taliban quickly surged into the capital of Kabul^[v] to the surprise of nearly every high-ranking US military official^[vi]. The history of global politics is rife with examples of incompetence, surprises, secrets, miracles, and disasters–but to simply list examples is not enough. With so many of these occurrences, one must ask: Are there inherent qualities of the international arena that are conducive to producing these unpredictable and often pivotal events?

According to American statesman and realist political scholar Kenneth Waltz, there are two assumptions one can make about the international system:

First, that the international political system is characterized by anarchy. That is, there is no system-wide authority which can enforce rules on all nations. In other words, nations are solely responsible for their own wellbeing and not that of other nations. This assumption is analogous to an economic market in which economic agents operate on imperfect information. With imperfect information, actors cannot make optimal choices because there is no way for them to know if they are maximizing benefit and minimizing costs.

Second, that states are the primary political actors in the international political arena. They are not necessarily the only actors (others include the United Nations, organizations like the Taliban, and even individuals), but they are the actors that make decisions and act as a singular voice on the global stage.

Our examples, then, are not just quirk moments in a normally well-ordered system; instead, they resulted from the lack of order among nations and the power differential between states and any other individuals or groups. The East German’s mistake was not just his alone, but that of a Soviet satellite collapsing without the once strong backing of the Soviet Union. During the Suez Crisis, France and Britain were not entitled to – and certainly did not receive – the support of the United States under any global law. Finally, the 2021 collapse of the Afghan government is characterized also by the failure of the American state rather than solely the strength and power of the non-governmental Taliban.

On the theoretical level, when these assumptions are made, the goal of a nation becomes simple: to maximize power. If there are no systemic protections for a nation, the only protection it can depend upon is that which it provides itself. Additionally, all states on the international stage are equal in that they face similar problems of managing the concerns and expectations of the citizens within that state. In other words, states face a problem that individuals and non-governmental organizations do not: they need to manage their self-preservation, as well as justify their existence continuously. Before a state can make moral considerations about what it ought to do, it must, for its very survival, maximize the material power it wields. Every nation must consider how every action it takes will affect its own power.

While the notion of power may seem relatively straightforward, its true source is up for debate. American author Charles Freeman Jr. noted in Kahlil Newton’s International Relations and World Politics that “Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. Power derives from strength and will”^[vii]. However, this definition does little to quell the confusion of the true, fundamental nature of power because it dictates what power produces, but not what constitutes it. Specifying the actions that make a nation powerful does not help either. If power is simply military might, then one would expect the French and British, a formidable military alliance at the time of the Suez Crisis, to have defeated Egypt and deeply mired their friendship with the United States. If power is derived solely from a loyal population, then why did the Taliban prevail, despite commanding support from merely 13.4% of the country’s population^[viii]? These are both clearly important metrics, but they do not completely explain the basis of national power.

Section III: Ideals as the Source of Power

To find what creates national power, we must consider a relative definition of power specifically concerning how power is wielded between nations. Thus, we ought to investigate how power is balanced within an international sphere. According to Meicen Sun of the University of Pennsylvania,

“[The] balance of power occurs when states have reservations about the major power or the hegemon’s intention but not to the extent that a precipitation to war is so imminent as to render balancing infeasible. […] [the balance of power also generally includes] a prevalent preference for relative gains and, more specifically, military positionality among states increases the likelihood of balancing relative to collective security. […] [Additionally,] the more rapid and unpredictable the flux of information in a given situation, the less likely that the balance of power contingent on existing beliefs and preferences will occur as predicted”^[ix].

In other words, nations will take part in a “balancing” action if their perception of another nation necessitate it, if they believe it will bring them relative benefit, and if they are operating on trusted information. Thus, power is a functional term that describes negotiation, compromise, and conflict amongst nations, and is best summarized as the ability to effectively deal with other states.

In order for a nation’s power to be lasting, it must permeate all aspects of the life within that nation. For example, the US controls the strongest military force in the world, yet also maintains one of the oldest liberal democracies on the planet. If another nation wanted to secure a natural resource that the US also sought, they would likely recognize a military intervention would be an utter failure, whereas a “free market” or “democratic” solution may be more readily achieved. If power consists of securing desired outcomes, and the US is not in a military situation where it can wield its powerful armed forces, then material strength is not a factor that generates power in this instance. The sources of national power must be evident in every facet of that nation, or else whatever power that nation has can simply be circumvented.

If a nation ought to maximize its power through relationships and dealings with other nations, and that power must be reflected as an inherent characteristic of that nation, the source of power becomes clear: ideals. As the rector of Glasgow University’s noted, Idealism is “the spirit which impels an individual or group of individuals to a loftier standard of conduct than that which ordinarily prevails around him or them”^[x]. The “loftier standard of conduct” does not necessarily mean esoteric ideals, but simply something that provides order to a nation within an inherently disordered world. Ideals are the moorings of nations, dictating what they value and what they ultimately seek to derive from any interaction with other states. Ideals must be a prerequisite and source of power because ideals define the methods nations take to deal with one another, and ultimately can decide in what scenarios a nation is foundationally prepared to succeed or not.

While ideals are often debatable and somewhat opaque, the requirement for a perpetual source of power places three requirements upon ideals if they are to provide a nation tangible power: definition, nontermination, and non-zero-sum.

Definite Ideals

Definition is the specificity of an ideal and how well it may help in the creation of a course of action. The importance of definite ideals flows naturally from the need for specific procedures that can be implemented over a long time period.

The United States’ 2003 Invasion of Iraq demonstrated how an indefinite ideal only creates greater conflict and greater uncertainty in a disordered world. Many scholars question the intent of the United States’ mission in the region post-September 11th, with some claiming regime change^[xi], the US’ desire for oil^[xii], countering supposed weapons of mass destruction^[xiii], vengeance for September 11^th attacks, or the maintenance of US hegemony in a post-Soviet world^[xiv] as key reasons for the US’ involvement in the region. Thus, the United States entered into conflict with Iraq without a clear plan, mission, or desire.

This incoherence destabilized Iraq irreparably and dismantled trust of the US in the region. According to Emeritus Chair in Strategy for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Anthony Cordesman characterized this sentiment by stating, “The United States has never defined workable grand strategic objectives, made effective efforts to create a stable post-conflict Iraq, or shown the [Iraqi] people its presence actually serves their interests”^[xv]. The unstable, neglected, and unempathetic state first created by the US in Iraq following the invasion led to 16 years of so-called “made in America” corruption throughout the Iraqi government and left the state ill-equipped to handle instability in Kurdistan, the radicalization of the nation’s west with the rise of ISIL, and growing tensions between the US and Iran^[xvi]. Cordesman noted again in 2019 that this “failed state” scenario is not unique to Iraq and is shared by nations that faced similarly disorganized approaches from the US, such as Afghanistan and Syria^[xvii]. The nonunique quality of Iraq, though, is not only due to the US’ ham-handed approach: the international community knows to expect certain fates when the US enters the fray as a result of the failure in Iraq^[xviii]. The US clearly demonstrated to other nations a lack of coherence or predictability that underpins good-faith negotiation when it invaded Iraq without a specific reason and followed no coherent plan in rebuilding the nation. The indefinite ideals that guided the Iraq War hindered the US’ power on the world stage.

Time-Independent Ideals

Nontermination means that the ideal must not be “achievable” in practical terms; once it is achieved, it cannot inspire or guide policy. 

The United States’ greatest terminating ideal – a world free of Communism – set the US up for failure after the Cold War. As Henry Kissinger notes in his treatise Diplomacy, by 1947 “America had opted for Western unity over East-West negotiations. […] Containment became the guiding principle of Western policy, and it remained so for the next forty years”^[xix]. In the pursuit of this goal, US power ballooned for decades through a growing military, expansive diplomatic missions, an advanced intelligence community, and the forceful export of American consumerism. But what does a nation do when the primary antagonist that these levers of power were meant to challenge suddenly disappears? On December 26^th, 1991, Deputy Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department Francis Fukuyama formulated that the “end of history” had arrived with the collapse of the Soviet Union, with liberalism taking root as the dominant and only ideology with global legitimacy and power^[xx]. However, as Louis Menand of the Atlantic notes,

“[Fukuyama] offered Cold War realists a kind of valediction: their mission, though philosophically misconceived, had been accomplished. […] Twenty-nine years later, it seems that the realists haven’t gone anywhere, and that history has a few more tricks up its sleeve […] Universal liberalism isn’t impeded by ideology, like fascism or communism, but by passion.”^[xxi].

Menand hints at the collapse of America’s grip upon the world as the only superpower after the Cold War; regional conflicts such as those in the Middle East and Africa involving non-state actors and the rise of China as a new dominant power on the world stage have mired what Fukuyama proposed as the new world order of liberalism. Overall, the US has become aimless in the wake of achieving a long sought-after goal.

Once the end of Communism was achieved, the United States lost its foreign policy foundation. Fukuyama and Menand, after nearly three decades, conclude that this shift in global power is explained simply: the US and western world had no idea what to do with itself. In other words, if one’s whole goal is contingent on one criterion and it is achieved, how does one react? With the US aimless in the post-Cold War, the answer to arising problems was still murky, and likely helped lead to the confusion in the buildup to the invasion of Iraq as discussed previously. Terminating ideals may inspire grand missions towards grand goals, but they only guarantee power in pursuit of the goal they seek to destroy.

Zero-Sum Ideals

The issue with a zero-sum relationship is less intuitive. A zero-sum situation is defined as the success of one party necessarily implying the failure or loss of the other party. When discussing the interaction between nations, one must remember that all resources are scarce, or that no nation has an unlimited supply of the resources necessary to trade, make war, or perform any other function of government. Taking scarcity to be a fact, zero-sum relationships fail for the same reason as ideals that are not long-lasting: they will eventually leech the life out of one nation into oblivion. In other words, a nation cannot create the sort of relationships that last decades and centuries if it is always exploiting that relationship for some gain only it will receive.

US policy in Latin America operated on a zero-sum belief, manifesting in the exploitation of the continent for political purposes. Throughout the Cold War period, United States policy dictated that the promotion of democracy was contingent on the elimination of Communism in the region. Throughout the 1960s, the US undertook an extensive aid program throughout the region known as the Alliance for Progress, which sought “to enlist the full energies of the people and governments of the American republics in a great cooperative effort to accelerate the economic and social development of the participating countries of Latin America, so that they may achieve maximum levels of well-being, with equal opportunities for all, in democratic societies adapted to their own needs and desires”[^xxii].

While built upon the intention of modernizing developing nations, the primary goal of the US in signing and investing in the Alliance was to mitigate communism in the region. The reasoning is best summed up by a 1964 National Intelligence briefing: “backwardness is not it itself a spur to revolution. But rising consciousness of deprivation is”^[xxiii]. The United States thus operated upon a belief that poverty would drive Latin Americans toward communism, and that US investment could raise the region out of poverty. Particularly, the US chose to hold important aid to a developing region hostage, on the condition that the region act as a showpiece in the American crusade against Communism.

This political exploitation resulted in greater turmoil within the continent and overall distrust of the United States. In Guatemala, the US invested in education programs through the Maryknoll Order, a Catholic missionary group^[xxiv]. But as the Maryknolls raised literacy rates, previously impoverished subsistence workers on plantations began to demand fairer wages and better working conditions^[xxv]. Once disagreements between peasants and the ruling plantation owners grew, the US increased military aid to stabilize the country, resulting in an oppressive regime and ultimately locking peasants back into their subsistence jobs^[xxvi]. A similar story took place in El Salvador as the US funded new education programs that extended education to rural villages^[xxvii]. However, with the US focus on anti-communism guiding the education program, US officials basically dictated the teaching agenda, usurping the autonomy that teachers previously enjoyed^[xxviii]. This in turn drove a rift between teachers and the government of El Salvador, which greenlit the program, and is crediting with beginning the teachers strikes that helped spark the social movements and later civil war of the 1980s^[xxix]. The list of instances where the US alienated key divisions of Latin American nations is endless. These divisions, though, can be blamed on the singular focus of the US on developing democracy and modernization in the region, which the US treated as only acceptable when communism was also curtailed.

Modernizing Latin America at the expense of communism’s growth in the region embodied the failure of zero-sum ideals. The growth of democracy was contingent on the decay of communism as an ideal manifest in aid being contingent on anti-revolutionary sentiment. However, this only increased instability and mistrust of the US in the region, and ultimately increased the sort of fervor that developed into revolution.

The zero-sum relationship worked exactly as it was formulated but not as it was intended; alliances meant to build prosperity ended up entrenching one nation in the affairs of the other and decimating the chances of a positive relationship. Zero-sum ideals destroy the fragile balance between nations seeking to advance and defend themselves on their own terms.

In short, the ideals of a nation form the basis for its power on the international stage; whatever a nation chooses to pursue materially, economically, or socially is decided in the heady realm of ideals first. But the caveat of realism must be applied, casting judgement on the ideals that can best serve a nation in its own quest for self-preservation in the international arena, where the empathy and good will of other nations is never assured. While not an exhaustive list, the principles of international anarchy and the balance of power dictate that ideals must be specific, look beyond achieving substantive success, and must not be founded on the exploitation of other nations.

Conclusion

Can a statesman afford to dream of a greater world when confronted with the truths of self-preservation and the balance of power? Can the sensitivities decimated by generations of unempathetic and careless action be rekindled?

Ideals are that which guide our behavior collectively, in that they embody the common values of a nation. In essence, they are the sensitivities of a society that Pessoa discusses. But the inherently unforgiving nature of our world will always challenge these sensitivities. To fully protect these ideals is to never act, to accept a passive life at the whim not of other nations, but of chance. The balance of valuing ideals and of recognizing the trials and unpredictability of living in the world is struck when Idealism is defined via Realist principles; a recognition that our better angels are not esoteric and abstract but are grounded within our own sensibilities. To reiterate, the diplomatic and bureaucratic institutions that serve us and our nations are human institutions; it is only right that the way we order conduct amongst these institutions is through an appeal to our ability to dream of a greater world.

While recognition of this is essential, it is far from enough. The US Army War College noted in a 1964 study that “It became apparent that idealism was a necessary ingredient if a broader concept of national security were to sustain public support”^[xxx]. The US recognized this truth nearly six decades ago. A recognition of the balance between Idealism and Realism requires not only a recognition of what ought to be done from this point forward, but of what has been done by previous generations to bring these two ideologies to bear. One ought to not only look forward with some sense of humility and empathy but back upon those that came before with the same care. If we are to create sustainable, power-bearing ideals, we need to recognize the failures of the past as mistakes made in front of a dauntingly uncertain world, not unlike the one we now face. The murky waters of international relations can be navigated best through an appeal to our better nature.

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[i] Kaplan, Robert D. “In Defense of Henry Kissinger.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 30 Apr. 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/05/the-statesman/309283/. 

[ii] Ashford, Elizabeth, and Tim Mulgan. “Contractualism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 20 Apr. 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractualism/#HowDoeConDifOthSocConThe. 

[iii] Keating, Joshua. “Anthony Bourdain Really, Really Hated Henry Kissinger.” Slate Magazine, Slate, 8 June 2018, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/anthony-bourdain-really-really-hated-henry-kissinger.html. 

[iv] Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. Easton Press, 1994. P. 544.

[v] Carl, Eric Schmitt and Traci. “Security Threats at Kabul Airport Prompt Multiple Warnings.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 4 Oct. 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/08/25/world/afghanistan-taliban-kabul-biden-news. 

[vi] Phil Stewart, Patricia Zengerle. “Afghan Army Collapse ‘Took Us All by Surprise,’ U.S. Defense Secretary Says.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 28 Sept. 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pentagon-leaders-face-afghanistan-reckoning-congress-2021-09-28/. 

[vii] Newton, Kahlil. International Relations and World Politics. ETP, 2019. 

[viii] Maizland, Lindsay. “What Is the Taliban?” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 Sept. 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan. 

[ix] Sun, Meicen. “Balance of Power Theory in Today’s International System.” E-International Relations, 12 Feb. 2014, https://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/12/balance-of-power-theory-in-todays-international-system/#_ftn2. 

[x] Smith, Birkenhead Frederick Edwin. Idealism in International Politics: A Rectorial Address Delivered at the University of Glasgow on November 3rd, 1923, by the Earl of Birkenhead. Peterborough Press, 1923. 

[xi] Kemper, BOb. “Saddam Can Keep Rule If He Complies: Bush.” Daily Times – Site Edition, https://web.archive.org/web/20040825024139/http:/www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_23-10-2002_pg4_1. 

[xii] Klare, Michael T. “For Oil and Empire? Rethinking War with Iraq.” Current History 102, no. 662 (2003): 129–35. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45317257.

[xiii] “From 2003: Colin Powell Addresses United Nations Security Council On Iraq.” Youtube, NBC News, 21 Oct. 2021, Accessed 2 Nov. 2021.

[xiv] Lieberfeld, Daniel. “THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND THE IRAQ WAR.” International Journal of Peace Studies 10, no. 2 (2005): 1–21. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41852927.

[xv] Davies, Nicolas J. “America’s Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf.” America’s Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf | Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 Oct. 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf. 

[xvi] Davies, Nicolas J S. “Iraqis Rise up against 16 Years of ‘Made in the USA’ Corruption.” OpenDemocracy, 3 Dec. 2019, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/iraqis-rise-against-16-years-made-usa-corruption/. 

[xvii] Cordesman, Anthony H., and Max Molot. “Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen: The Long-Term Civil Challenges and Host Country Threats from ‘Failed State’ Wars.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22601.

[xviii] Ignatius, David. “Why the Middle East Knows Not to Trust the United States.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 25 Oct. 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-the-middle-east-knows-not-to-trust-the-united-states/2016/10/25/09c00c52-9afa-11e6-b3c9-f662adaa0048_story.html. 

[xix] Kissinger, 445.

[xx] Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest, no. 16 (1989): 3–18. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184.

[xxi] Menand, Louis, et al. “Francis Fukuyama Postpones the End of History.” The New Yorker, 27 Aug. 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/03/francis-fukuyama-postpones-the-end-of-history. 

[xxii] “The Charter of Punta Del Este, Establishing an Alliance for Progress Within the Framework of Operation Pan America; August 17, 1961.” Avalon Project – Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam16.asp. 

[xxiii] Streeter, Stephen M. “Nation-Building in the Land of Eternal Counter-Insurgency: Guatemala and the Contradictions of the Alliance for Progress.” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 58. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4017659.

[xxiv] Streeter, 61.

[xxv] Streeter, 62.

[xxvi] Streeter, 64.

[xxvii] Lindo-Fuentes, Héctor. “Educational Television in El Salvador and Modernisation Theory.” Journal of Latin American Studies 41, no. 4 (2009): 761. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744205.

[xxviii] Lindo-Fuentes, 762.

[xxix] Lindo-Fuentes, 757.

[xxx] Jablonsky, David, Ronald Steel, Lawrence Korb, Morton H. Halperin, and Robert Ellsworth. “U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY: BEYOND THE COLD WAR.” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1997. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11886.

Photo credits to Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. Easton Press, 1994. P. IV.