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Europe – An Exclusive Sanctuary: Comparing Europe’s Differing Reactions to Migrants and Refugees in 2015 and after the Invasion of Ukraine

 Sydney Wilhelmy

May 31, 2022

In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Europe has revealed that its prior inability to effectively deal with a migration crisis may have had far more to do with the type of migrants in question than the political and economic burdens of letting them into EU states. Since the post-war years of the 20th century, Europe’s relationship with migration has seemed to follow a steady trajectory, best recognized as an increasing unwillingness to bear the perceived economic, social, and political burden which it is argued migrants bring.

The Ukrainian refugee crisis is one of two large migrant and refugee crises to hit Europe since the end of the Second World War. Looking solely at numbers for the two, their significance becomes evident. In the first crisis, commonly referred to as the European Migrant Crisis of 2015, Europe faced unprecedentedly high numbers of migrants and refugee arrivals in the period between 2008-2018, primarily from North Africa and the Middle East. Over this decade, 2.4 million migrants and refugees attempted to enter Europe. Of those, one million alone entered in the year 2015, from which the crisis’s name originates. The surge in 2015 is largely attributable to Syrian refugees and migrants fleeing the Syrian Civil War as the conflict escalated at this time. (It should be noted, however, that the crisis is by no means over – arrivals into Europe were up 57% from 2020 in 2021 at 200,000).[1] While met initially with hospitality and empathy by both the general public and the member states, an effective EU-wide response was never seen. While a comprehensive post-crisis EU legislation package was passed, it failed to significantly engender a shift away from the chaotic and inconsistent implementation of migration policy in the bloc.[2] The recent Ukrainian refugee crisis, on the other hand, was initially expected to result in nearly seven million displaced people, four million of whom the EU predicted would enter its territory.[3] At the time of writing, however, more than ten million are displaced and over four million have fled the country into neighboring states—all in less than two months. These numbers are certainly large enough to warrant comparison to the EU’s migration crisis of 2015.[4] [5]

Unlike the EU’s dragging and too-little-too-late policy response to the migration crisis of 2015, the EU’s policy response to the predicted influx of Ukrainian migrants was swift, unified, clear, and consistent. In fact, it quickly became evident that the two responses could not be any more different, relative to the expected size of the “burden” of hosting such refugees.

A deeper look into the differing realities of Ukrainian refugees and those making up the majority of those in the 2015 surge (primarily from Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon and across a broad swathe of states in northern and western Africa) reveals the discrepancy in the treatment of the two groups. Migrants having arrived in Europe between 2008 and the present day (apart from the current Ukrainian refugees) have faced a hostile, complex, and lengthy process with a low official rate of asylum approval relative to total arrival numbers. As set in the Dublin Convention of 1990, asylum seekers in Europe must apply for asylum in the country they arrive in. As a result, there are few options for them to move within Europe to their desired destination once they have officially entered the bloc (at least legally). This leaves them in the hands of overwhelmed and overburdened states such as Italy, Greece, and to an extent, Hungary. Due to the Dublin Convention ¾ signed in 1990 and last amended in 2017 ¾ there is little to no meaningful mechanism ensuring solidarity and burden sharing among EU member states during periods of mass migration, creating far more structural problems down the line.[6]

Furthermore, migrants and refugees arriving to Europe, often through means deemed “illegal,” face a hostile and unenthusiastic host country from whom they must beg to be allowed to stay (“legal” means may often be effectively closed to migrants who cannot afford to pursue them or for whom they are impractical as they flee conflict, poverty, and other general sources of insecurity). In 2015, the Pew Research Center conducted opinion polling throughout the EU and found that more than 50% of respondents in Poland, France, Italy, and Greece saw immigrants as burdens on their country and a threat to job markets and welfare systems.[7] In Italy, Greece, and Germany, 45% or more held the belief that immigrants in their country were more to blame for crime than other groups, and in Hungary, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy, 60% or more of respondents agreed with the statement that refugees will “increase the likelihood of terrorism” in their country.[8] It is quite clear that the environment into which refugees from the Middle East and North and West Africa are entering is hostile to their presence. This hostility is often expressed as fear and prejudice, creating a dangerous tension naturally antagonistic to integration, acceptance, and trust-building in the communities where refugees and migrants eventually settle.

Ukrainian refugees currently experience, and will likely continue to experience in the coming months, treatment unrecognizable from that received by their fellow refugees and asylum seekers from the south and east. The EU has disregarded its standing legislation on asylum seekers and migration and has “showed unprecedented unity” by unilaterally issuing swift and broad exemptions applying to all Ukrainian refugees. These exemptions grant them “a residence permit and access to employment, social welfare and housing for up to three years” with no requirement for an asylum application upon any point of entry — all asylum applications of Ukrainian refugees have been approved ex-ante. This includes Ukrainian citizens, legal residents, and those who had sought asylum in Ukraine previously. Notably, foreign students or others who in theory have the option of returning home somewhere else outside of Ukraine or the EU were not included in this provision.[9]  Ukrainian refugees are granted freedom of movement within the bloc, allowing many of them to reach established Ukrainian communities spread throughout the continent without becoming stuck in a border country such as previous waves of migrants have been due to the Dublin Convention’s asylum requirements.4 This process was justified using a legal temporary protection mechanism first set up in 2001. The mechanism’s creation was an attempt by the EU in the aftermath of the Yugoslavian conflict to prepare for and handle the expected influx of migrants and refugees. However, the mechanism was never used, and thus this is the first time it has been employed since its inception.9

It cannot be understated the discrepancy in rhetoric around the Ukrainians’ arrival to the bloc versus that received by refugees and migrants from the south and east. The Polish interior minister Mariusz Kaminski told reporters that “anyone fleeing from bombs, from Russian rifles, can count on the support of the Polish state”, and Slovakia granted free health care and work permits to all Ukrainian migrants entering the country.4  Migrants arriving from Syria, the Middle East, and Africa received no such promises or open welcomes, and more than not faced open hostility and the erection of physical barriers in its place.

 The difference in treatment and policy response to Ukrainian refugees and all other migrants becomes stark when one considers the tense geopolitical crisis on the border between Belarus and Poland in late 2021. Belarus had just forced the landing of a plane in Minsk to capture an influential opposition figure on board the flight. Crucially, the flight was between two EU and NATO member states and was operated by an Irish airline. The illegality of the act, on top of the affront to EU economic interests and the rights of the foreign nationals on board, led to swift implementation of sanctions from the West. In this case, Belarus retaliated against these sanctions by fabricating a migrant crisis on its shared border with Poland. Belarus sponsored the journey of thousands of migrants, mainly Kurdish, to Minsk from which they pushed them toward Poland promising them an opportunity to enter the EU. Many, if not all of the migrants flown in, were vastly uninformed or unaware of the geopolitical conflict in which they had become pawns. Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko framed these migrants as “human traffickers, drug smugglers, and armed migrants” and purposely misdirected them and instilled false hopes of obtaining asylum in the EU.[10] Poland framed the crisis as an attack and militarized its border with Belarus, banning journalists, doctors, and NGOs from entering as they repelled the migrants back over the border in the same fashion as one might drive out an invading army. There were 15 reported lives lost by the end of the crisis.

Further evidence that European migration policy directly reflects the varying desirability of the migrants comes from the Ukrainian crisis itself —that, what may have at first appeared to be an unconditional acceptance of Ukrainian refugees, is invariably dependent on the demographics of the migrant. Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov stated that the Ukrainian migrants were “Europeans, not the refugees we are used to” and that they are, compared to prior groups of refugees, “intelligent” and “educated people” and not “people with unclear pasts, who could have been even terrorists”.[11]

The difference in perception of Ukrainian migrants versus those from the Middle East and North Africa raises a few points worth touching on. First, there is an undeniable shared history between eastern European states and Ukraine — a great deal of their culture, traditions, and even languages and histories overlap or share key components. Thus, to view them as a people with whom close personal and historic ties are shared can understandably create a marked difference in tone and policy towards the plight of those people. However, this does not sufficiently explain and most certainly does not justify the differing policy responses afforded to the two groups – for which no other observation can be made but that certain lives are valued and protected at a far higher and undeniably discriminatory rate than others in the European Union.

There will be important questions to answer moving forward — namely, why did the EU not act as swiftly and in such a manner of solidarity when the refugees came from the Middle East and Africa? Why was the temporary protection mechanism not utilized to deal with mass refugee flows from those fleeing the Syrian conflict? Any prior observation of the discourse surrounding the development of the EU’s migration policy since the early 2010s would point to institutional capacity limitations as the main obstacle to the reform of migration policy. It has become clear that this was likely not the case.

The EU may yet eventually grow more conservative in its views on hosting Ukrainian refugees as the numbers begin to swell. However, regardless of the evolution of European public opinion in the coming weeks and months, Europe’s reaction to Ukrainian refugees will not go

unnoticed by those both in and outside of Europe. Particularly those, as they flee or have fled their own persecution, war, hunger, or economic despair, were greeted with guns and open hostility. It seems undeniable that Europe is certainly a bastion of the free world — yet it has proven that its doors are not open to all those who seek sanctuary or a future within its walls.

Resources

  1. The European Union – Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ). (2022, January

11). EU External Borders in 2021: Arrivals Above Pre-Pandemic Levels. FRONTEX. Retrieved from https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/eu-external-borders-in-2021-ar rivals-above-pre-pandemic-levels-CxVMNN.

  1. Majcher, I. (2020). The EU return system under the Pact on Migration and Asylum: A case of tipped interinstitutional balance? European law journal : review of European law in context, 26(3-4), 199-225. doi:10.1111/eulj.12383
  2. Pronczuk, M. (2022, February 27). EU will ask states to grant asylum to Ukrainian refugees … The New York Times. Retrieved March 3, 2022, from https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/27/world/europe/european-union-ukrainian-refugees-a sylum.html
  3. Dow Jones & Company. (2022, March 2). One million people have fled Ukraine since Russian attack, U.N. Refugee Agency says. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved March 2, 2022, from https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-02/card/one-milli on-people-have-fled-ukraine-since-russian-attack-u-n-refugees-agency-says-INYVdTDq OnfaP4NADXAs
  4. BBC. (2022, April 6). How many Ukrainians have fled their homes and where have they gone? BBC News. Retrieved April 6, 2022, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60555472
  5. Huggler, J. (2017, July 26). EU Court rejects ‘open-door’ policy and upholds right of member states to deport refugees . The Telegraph. Retrieved March 4, 2022, from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/26/eu-court-rejects-open-door-policy-upholds -right-member-states/
  6. Pew Research Center. (2015, April 23). Many in EU want less immigration. Pew Research Center. Retrieved March 4, 2022, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/24/refugees-stream-into-europe-where-th ey-are-not-welcomed-with-open-arms/ft_15-04-22_eu-immigration/
  7. Pew Research Center. (2016, September 13). Many Europeans concerned refugees will increase domestic terrorism. Pew Research Center. Retrieved March 4, 2022, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-cris is-in-5-charts/refugees_1/
  8. Blenkinsop, P., & Szakacs, G. (2022, March 3). EU backs move to give Ukraine refugees temporary residency. Reuters. Retrieved March 3, 2022, from https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-prepares-millions-refugees-ukraine-2022-03-0 3/
  9. Evans, J. (2021, May 28). Belarus dictator threatens to ‘flood eu with drugs and migrants’. The Week UK. Retrieved March 3, 2022, from https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/europe/952979/belarus-dictator-threatens-fl ood-eu-with-drugs-migrants-avoid-sanctions
  10. Brito, R. (2022, March 1). Europe welcomes Ukrainian refugees — others, less so … The Sun Herald. Retrieved March 4, 2022, from https://www.sunherald.com/news/nation-world/world/article258867883.html

[1] “EU External Borders in 2021: Arrivals Above Pre-Pandemic Levels.” FRONTEX. https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/eu-external-borders-in-2021-arrivals-above-pre-pandemic-levels-CxVMNN. (retrieved March 4, 2022).

[2] Majcher, I. “The EU return system under the Pact on Migration and Asylum: A case of tipped interinstitutional balance? European law journal : review of European law in context, 26(3-4), 199-225.” 12383 (2020):

[3] Pronczuk, M. “EU will ask states to grant asylum to Ukrainian refugees …” The New York Times. Retrieved March 3, February 27, 2022.

[4] “One million people have fled Ukraine since Russian attack, U.N.” Refugee Agency says. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved March 2, March 2, 2022.

[5] ,BBC. (2022, April 6). How many Ukrainians have fled their homes and where have they gone? BBC News. Retrieved April 6, 2022, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60555472

[6] Huggler, J. “EU Court rejects ‘open-door’ policy and upholds right of member states to deport refugees .” The Telegraph. Retrieved March 4, July 26, 2017.

[7] “Many in EU want less immigration.” Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/24/refugees-stream-into-europe-where-th ey-are-not-welcomed-with-open-arms/ft_15-04-22_eu-immigration/ (retrieved March 4, 2022).

[8] “Many Europeans concerned refugees will increase domestic terrorism.” Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts/refugees_1/ (retrieved March 4, 2022).

[9] Blenkinsop, P and G Szakacs. “EU backs move to give Ukraine refugees temporary residency.” Reuters. Retrieved March 3, March 3, 2022.

[10] Evans, J. “Belarus dictator threatens to ‘flood eu with drugs and migrants’.” The Week UK. Retrieved March 3, May 28, 2021.

[11] Brito, R. “Europe welcomes Ukrainian refugees — others, less so …” The Sun Herald. Retrieved March 4, March 1, 2022.

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