Hannah Hargraves

October 18, 2025

Across the world, birth rates are declining in first world countries, with those in East Asia being hit the hardest [4]. In 2024, Japan had 686,061 babies born–the lowest since they’ve started recording in 1899 [2]. South Korea only had 283,000 born last year, keeping them as the only OECD country with a birth rate below the replacement rate of 2.1 [1,6]. These countries, two of the largest economies in the world, are also home to some of the largest elderly populations. With birth rates declining, however, both Japan and South Korea are at risk of an economic collapse from worker shortages. When responding to this demographic crisis, Japan and South Korea must address more than just the economic aspects of the crisis, and create policy that recognizes other vital factors such as marriage, parenthood, and caregiving.

Both countries’ populations have been steadily decreasing for the past decade. Last year, Japan’s fertility rate fell from 1.2 to 1.15 and South Korea’s rose slightly from 0.72 to 0.75 [6]. However, they’re both significantly below the needed replacement rate of 2.1. The replacement rate is the average amount of children per woman that a country needs in order to maintain its population.

The cost of living and raising a child are already a major reason people in those countries are having fewer kids. Since replacement rates are already so low in Japan and South Korea, this will likely create a vicious cycle of labor shortages and increased welfare spending, which will further discourage people from starting families [6].

In addition to the economic issues, most Japanese and Korean women list social issues as the reason they are not having kids [1]. Both countries tend to have more traditional views of family life, including waiting until marriage to have kids, and having wives be the primary caretakers of the children, even with a full-time job. In 2023, Korea saw an increase in marriages which is thought to be the reason why there was an, albeit small, spike in births last year [3]. In Korea it’s also traditional for a woman to keep her last name, whereas in Japan couples are legally required to have the same last name, which acts as another deterrent for women to get married [9]. Traditional, cultural views of childrearing results in, as the IMF reported, “Women in Japan and Korea perform approximately five times more unpaid housework and caregiving than men, more than double the OECD average for gaps between men and women in unpaid work” [1] What makes this worse is that both of these countries have high amount of paternity and maternity leave, yet, in 2022, only 17.3% of Japanese men taking leave as opposed to 80.2% of Japanese women [7]. 

The Japanese and Korean governments are creating and supporting more initiatives to try and combat the social and economic issues. Through government programs like Childcare at Birth Leave, Childcare Leave, and the Dad and Mom Childcare Leave Plus, Japanese fathers are entitled to a variety of paternity leave options, with the ability to take over 100 days off and still receive around 67% of their salary for the time missed [7]. Mothers are also entitled to the same amount of maternity leave, plus Nursing Leave, flexible hours, and shorter days. Companies also have to sponsor childcare, either through their own daycare or paying for equivalent services. South Korea has similarly large amounts of time off, which is paid for by both the company and the government [8]. The National Assembly also recently passed amendments to its Gender Equal Employment and Work-Family Balance Act and the Labor Standards Act, which are expected to take effect this upcoming February. It will offer increased maternity leave time for cases of premature or multiple births (e.g. twins), and allowed time off for infertility treatments. It also increased childcare leave for single parents and parents of disabled children [8]. Through these policy initiatives, South Korea has spent around $283 billion USD over 20 years trying to increase marriages and childbirths [5]. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has now said that Japan will spend up to $22.3 billion USD per year for the next six to seven years to increase marriage and childbirth incentives [9]. 

But why isn’t the money working? Because the culture hasn’t changed. Traditional roles of marriage and children are still prevalent. You must get married first, then have kids, and then have the wife stay home and take care of the house and children, but the younger generation in Japan and South Korea have lost interest. The cost-of-living demands two income households, yet culture still expects women to do the majority of housework and childcare [1]. Unmarried and childless women see this and then react against it in their personal life choices. A 2021 survey revealed that 17% of men and 15% of women in Japan do not plan to ever marry which, in a culture that opposes single parents and common-law marriages, means that these percentiles are unlikely to have any children in their lifetime [9]. In South Korea, the social stigma for single mothers and impoverished families had led to putting thousands of kids up for adoption despite the country’s fertility crisis. Less than 1% of these children are put in foster homes, and only 100-200 are adopted per year, with about half being sent overseas [5]. So a solution lies not just in increasing the birth rate, but also in mending the culture in order to be more accepting of and willing to raise children.  

The future of fertility in Japan and South Korea is grim, but not entirely hopeless. The policies will still have an impact on struggling parents, allowing them more time to have and be with their children, without having to throw away their careers. But lawmakers and politicians will also need to promote involved fathers, supporting education, and accepting, more diverse family structures [1]. They could even introduce policies to make it easier for people to immigrate to and live in Japan and South Korea, weakening a longheld monoethnic mindset. South Korea has already introduced the F-4 visas, which allows members of the Korean diaspora to more easily return, live, work, and study there [5]. They could strengthen it by making it easier for Korean adoptees to return if they wish, and Japan could replicate both of these strategies for itself too, as it does not currently have any visas specifically for the Japanese diaspora. Japan and South Korea increase their population by welcoming immigrants, particularly couples and families.

Although these policy initiatives are a good start, some experts suggest that it may be too late to restore population and fertility growth. Perhaps Japan and South Korea may simply need to accept their declines [9]. This is one of the most pressing issues in OECD countries that will, ultimately, be decided upon by couples, not policymakers. Even if there was a huge uptick in births, all of those children will still need to grow up, stay in Japan or South Korea, work to pay for social security, and have children of their own. It will be a long process to increase the fertility rate, and it probably will not work out perfectly. Japan and South Korea need to brace for impact and accept that their countries will change because of the declining population, but they should still keep working to improve their pro-family policies in order to give themselves a fighting chance for the future, or they will be irrevocably changed by population decline. 

Photo from [2]

Works Cited

[1] Asao, Kohei, et al. “Empowering Women Could Boost Fertility, Economic Growth in Japan and Korea.” IMF, International Monetary Fund, 21 May 2024, www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/05/17/Empowering-Women-Could-Boost-Fertility-Economic-Growth-in-Japan-and-Korea. 
[2] Associated Press. “Japan’s Annual Births Fall to Record Low as Population Emergency Deepens.” CNN, Cable News Network, 5 June 2025, www.cnn.com/2025/06/05/asia/japan-birth-rate-record-low-intl-scli#. 
[3] De Guzman, Chad. “Marriages Tick up in Asia but Long-Term Demographic Challenges Persist.” Time, Time, 19 Mar. 2024, time.com/6958285/china-south-korea-marriage-statistics-trend-increase/. 
[4] “Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman).” World Bank Open Data, United Nations, data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN. 
[5] Jensen, Malene. “Embracing Diverse Families Could Stem South Korea’s Fertility Crisis .” East Asian Forum, 29 Mar. 2024, eastasiaforum.org/2024/03/29/embracing-diverse-families-could-stem-south-koreas-fertility-crisis/. 
[6] Kim, Hyung-Jin. “South Korean Births Increased Last Year for the First Time in Nearly a Decade.” AP News, AP News, 27 Feb. 2025, apnews.com/article/south-korea-babies-fertility-rate-dde1e536cd8b7a65cf30fe3f91983162#. 
[7] Kimoto, Keiko. “Paternity Leave in Japan .” Tokyo Dev, 8 Apr. 2025, www.tokyodev.com/articles/paternity-leave-in-japan. 
[8] Lockton. “South Korea Expands Family Leave Entitlements.” Lockton, 6 Jan. 2025, global.lockton.com/us/en/news-insights/south-korea-expands-family-leave-entitlements. 
[9] Takao, Yasuo. “Why Cash Alone Won’t Solve Japan’s Baby Deficit .” East Asia Forum, 23 July 2024, eastasiaforum.org/2024/07/23/why-cash-alone-wont-solve-japans-baby-deficit/.