Jeremiah Veras

May 16, 2026

Introduction 

As of February 2026, a landmark trial is underway in the Los Angeles County Superior Court against Meta and Google, regarding allegations that their platforms are deliberately designed to addict and harm children and teenagers. The trial was initiated by a lawsuit from a 20-year-old woman identified by her initials, K.G.M (or Kaley G.M). It is alleged that she became addicted to YouTube and Instagram at a young age, starting YouTube at 6 years old and Instagram at 14 years old, leading to severe mental health issues, including anxiety, depression, and body dysmorphia. K.G.M also claims that a lack of sufficient guardrails and warnings on social media led to compulsive use and worsening mental health concerns. (Grabenstein, 2026)  

This lawsuit contends that the plaintiff’s mental injuries were caused by the purposeful design choice made by companies that sought to make their platforms more addictive to boost their profits. Meta attempts to revisit issues already resolved by the court in its ruling on the Defendant’s pleading. Specifically, it contends that K.G.M. cannot establish liability based on the “infinite scroll” design feature, arguing that this feature merely encouraged the Plaintiff to continue viewing content. (K.G.M. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. 2026, 2). (K.G.M. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. 2026, 2). This claim invokes Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230).  

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act shields platforms from being treated as publishers of third-party content. Whether that protection extends to algorithmic engagement architecture is the central question this case presents. This lawsuit is commonly compared to the 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, where states alleged manufacturers knew tobacco was addictive and dangerous, hid these facts, and targeted youth, resulting in fraudulent marketing and healthcare expenditures. The comparison suggests that plaintiffs seek to frame social media platforms not merely as intermediaries of user speech, but as corporate actors that knowingly designed products with harmful effects. This trial may reveal the private information that social media keeps about its algorithms and the data that informs design decisions (Duncan, 2026). The trial also argues whether social media companies have a responsibility to consider the mental health impacts of design interfaces, algorithms, and content management.  

This article argues that Section 230 should not extend to algorithmic design features that platforms themselves create, particularly when those features are intentionally engineered to increase user engagement in ways that can cause harm. While courts have traditionally treated recommendation systems as protected editorial functions, this paper contends that modern engagement-driven design goes beyond content distribution and instead constitutes platform-created conduct. As a result, claims based on algorithmic design should fall outside Section 230 immunity, especially in cases involving harm to minors. 

The Origins, Purpose, and Judicial Interpretation of Section 230  

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 provides broad federal immunity to providers and users of interactive computer services. Generally, it protects interactive computer services and their users from being held liable for information provided by another person. Still, it does not prevent them from being held liable for information they have developed or for activities unrelated to third-party content (Congress.gov 2026). The statute consists of two principal immunity provisions. First, Section 230(c)(1), which specifies that service providers and users may not “be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Second, Section 230(c)(2) states that service providers and users may not be held liable for voluntarily acting in good faith to restrict access to objectionable content. These provisions emphasize that Congress sought to promote the growth of the internet while encouraging the development and use of filtering technologies to limit children’s access to inappropriate material and to support enforcement of federal criminal laws related to obscenity, stalking, and harassment online. This statutory purpose matters because it frames the scope of immunity in terms of publishing and moderation, concepts that later become central to disputes over whether platform design choices fall within Section 230’s protections.

The amendment that would become Section 230 was solicited in response to Stratton Oakmont, Inc v. Prodigy Services Co. (1995), a New York Supreme Court case that held an online service, “Prodigy”,  which advertised itself as family friendly and engaged in extensive filtering of inappropriate material, on summary judgment in a libel case to have taken on the role of a “publisher” and therefore was strictly liable for any defamatory user content, whether it knew about the content or not. (Hassell v. [Respondent], No. 18-506). Congress passed Section 230 to ensure that interactive services that attempt to remove problematic content are not treated as “publishers” and forced to pay defamation judgments.  

Courts soon adopted a broad reading of Section 230, beginning with the Fourth Circuit’s influential decision in Zeran v. America Online in 1997. In that case, the court held that Section 230(c)(1) prohibits claims that attempt to hold an online service liable for what it described as traditional editorial functions. These functions include decisions about whether to publish, remove, edit, or delay material created by users. According to the court, any lawsuit that seeks to impose liability for these kinds of editorial decisions necessarily treats the service as a publisher, which Section 230 forbids. Under this interpretation, the specific theory of liability is not important. Whether a plaintiff frames a claim as negligence, defamation, failure to warn, or some other tort, Section 230(c)(1) applies if the claim arises from content that originated with a party other than the platform itself. 

Following Zeran, federal appellate courts consistently expanded the scope of Section 230 immunity. Courts read the statute to bar a wide range of claims involving the hosting, organizing, recommending, or moderating of third-party content. The result is an interpretation of Section 230(c)(1) that treats nearly all decisions about the presentation or handling of user content as protected editorial judgment. At the same time, courts have recognized important limits. Section 230 does not apply when a platform creates or develops unlawful content at issue, and it does not shield the platform from duties that arise independently of publishing decisions. For example, courts have allowed claims involving broken contractual promises or duties to warn based on information obtained offline, because these claims do not depend on treating the platform as the publisher of user-generated material.

Together, these interpretations led to a broad legal framework. Platforms are generally immune when liability would attach to the content or conduct of third-party speakers, and when the challenged activity involves the platform’s editorial control over that content. Although this framework was developed in an era of message boards and static websites, it now governs complex social media platforms whose core features include recommendation algorithms and engagement-driven design choices. These modern features raise the question of the extent to which algorithmic engagement can be understood as a form of protected editorial activity under Section 230, and how courts should approach this question as lawsuits increasingly challenge the structural design of social media platforms rather than the content created by users. 

Section 230 and the Emerging Legal Challenges to Algorithmic Design  

Against this legal background, the key question becomes whether modern platform design features, particularly algorithmic systems that shape user engagement, fit within the traditional understanding of protected editorial functions or fall outside Section 230’s scope altogether. The lawsuits currently moving through state and federal courts, including the ongoing action against Meta and Google in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, signal a shift in how plaintiffs attempt to bypass Section 230 immunity. Instead of arguing that platforms should be liable for specific pieces of harmful user content, plaintiffs increasingly claim that harm results from the design of the platforms themselves. This strategy focuses on features such as infinite scroll, recommended content, and behavioral algorithms that determine what users see and how long they remain engaged. Behavioral algorithms refer to systems that track and analyze user activity, such as likes, watch time, clicks, search history, and scrolling patterns, to predict user preferences and deliver personalized content. For example, platforms may prioritize videos like ones a user has watched to completion, recommend posts based on prior interactions, or send push notifications timed to when a user is most likely to re-engage. These claims attempt to treat design choices as a separate category of conduct that falls outside Section 230’s traditional protection for editorial functions. Courts applying Section 230 have historically treated actions like hosting, organizing, removing, or recommending user content as editorial functions that are immune from liability. Courts later reinforced this approach by emphasizing that immunity applies regardless of the particular cause of action, as long as the harm ultimately arises from third-party content rather than platform-created material. Because courts apply a structured test for Section 230 immunity, the critical question becomes whether the platform’s actions can be characterized as publisher functions or instead as contributing to the development of the content. Applying this framework, the plaintiff in the Los Angeles County case must argue that the platform’s conduct went beyond traditional publisher functions and instead materially contributed to the harmful content at issue. (16).

The central legal question in the current wave of litigation is whether algorithmic features should be considered protected by editorial tools under Section 230 or unprotected product design choices. Many recent plaintiffs argue for the latter. Cases involving YouTube, Snapchat, and TikTok claim that features such as endless feeds, “For You” pages, push notifications, and auto-recommendation are independent sources of harm because they are engineered to maximize attention. They frame these allegations as product liability or negligence claims to sidestep Section 230, arguing either that the platform’s design constitutes a defective product that caused harm or that the platform failed to exercise reasonable care in preventing foreseeable harm to users. 

Federal appellate courts have been hesitant to accept this distinction. Several circuits have concluded that algorithms are essentially tools that help platforms organize and present content, which are activities traditionally understood as editorial. In Force v. Facebook (2019), plaintiffs alleged that Facebook’s recommendation algorithms suggested terrorist-related content and helped connect users to Hamas, thereby contributing to real-world harm. The Second Circuit rejected this argument, stating that recommendation algorithms are neutral systems that treat all content alike and therefore fall squarely within the scope of Section 230(c)(1). This “neutral system” reasoning has become a central defense for platforms, as courts often view algorithms as passive tools that apply the same rules to all content rather than actively shaping or creating it. Under this view, recommendation systems merely reflect user inputs and existing content, which keeps them within Section 230’s protection. However, critics argue that modern algorithms are not truly neutral, as they are designed to prioritize engagement and can amplify certain types of harmful content in ways that go beyond traditional editorial functions. From this perspective, targeted recommendations and platform design choices may constitute a form of content development, weakening the claim that such systems are purely neutral. Similarly, in Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group (2019), the plaintiff alleged that the platform’s recommendation and notification features encouraged a user to join a drug-related forum, ultimately leading to a fatal overdose. The Ninth Circuit held that these features were mechanisms that automatically manage user-generated information and do not transform a platform into the developer of the underlying content. These decisions suggest that algorithmic sorting, ranking, and recommending functions remain protected because they are tied directly to the handling of third-party speech. These decisions suggest that algorithmic sorting, ranking, and recommending functions remain protected because they are tied directly to the handling of third-party speech. 

Nevertheless, some courts have begun to explore narrower interpretations of Section 230. A small number of recent decisions distinguish editorial functions and platform conduct that allegedly induce or materially contribute to harmful content. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com(2008) held that a platform becomes a content developer when it contributes materially to the unlawful nature of the information. More recently, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Henderson v. Source for Public Data (2022) expressed skepticism about extending immunity to activities that are not clearly linked to publishing or to the content itself. These decisions do not directly control cases involving social media addiction claims, but they indicate a potential judicial interest in reevaluating the boundaries of Section 230 in the context of modern platform design.  This judicial uncertainty is mirrored by increasing pressure from outside the courts, as lawmakers in Congress have introduced multiple proposals to limit or repeal Section 230, particularly in response to concerns about algorithmic harms and child safety. For example, recent bills such as the “Sunset Section 230 Act” would eliminate the law’s protections entirely after a set period, while other proposals seek to impose a duty of care on platforms for harm caused by their recommendation systems. 

Why Section 230 Should Not Protect Algorithmic Design

Algorithmic engagement systems are products that platforms engineer, not speech that users create, and courts should allow lawsuits that challenge these designs without granting Section 230 immunity. The rise of algorithmic recommendation systems, infinite scroll features, accelerated notification structures, and other engagement-driven designs represents a fundamental shift in how platforms influence user behavior. Unlike content contributed by users, these profit-oriented design choices originate within the companies themselves. They reflect deliberate decisions about how the platform operates, how attention is captured, and how information is delivered. Scholarship in persuasive technology shows that design architecture can shape cognitive patterns, reinforce compulsive behaviors, and guide user attention in ways that can be particularly harmful to young users. Persuasive technology is defined as the design of digital systems intended to influence user attitudes and behaviors through targeted psychological mechanisms (9). Foundational work by B.J. Fogg demonstrates that behavior can be systematically engineered through the interaction of motivation, ability, and prompts, allowing platforms to structure environments that promote repeated engagement (10). This evidence supports the argument that such design features may go beyond traditional publisher functions and instead constitute a form of content development, which could place them outside the protections of Section 230. 

Recent studies on social media addiction confirm that these features can produce compulsive usage patterns, including persistent checking, anxiety when offline, and interference with daily functioning. Daria J. Kuss and Mark D. Griffiths (2017), both leading researchers in behavioral addiction, draw on clinical and survey-based research to identify patterns of problematic social media use. Neurobehavioral research also suggests that repeated engagement with social media activates dopamine-based reward systems like those involved in other forms of behavioral addiction, reinforcing dependency over time. Christian Montag and Jan-Hinrik Diefenbach (2018) support this conclusion through neuroscience-based studies examining brain activity and reward processing. Scholars examining the ethics of the attention economy argue that these design choices are not neutral, but instead intentionally exploit psychological vulnerabilities to maximize user engagement. James Williams (2018), a former Google strategist, advances this argument through critical analysis of platform design incentives. This body of research supports the argument that the harms associated with social media use stem not only from third-party speech, but from the architecture of the platforms themselves. This distinction is legally significant because it supports the argument that platform design features may constitute a form of content development rather than mere editorial activity, potentially placing such conduct outside the protections of Section 230. 

For this reason, the immunity that Section 230 provides for publisher-like decisions should not apply to claims focused on platform design. When plaintiffs argue that features such as infinite scroll or algorithmic recommendations cause foreseeable harm, their claims address how the platform itself was built. These claims do not treat the company as a publisher of user speech but instead challenge the company’s own conduct in creating a potentially dangerous digital environment. Courts have recognized similar distinctions in other cases. The Ninth Circuit has held that Section 230 does not apply when liability arises from duties that exist independently of content moderation, such as a duty to warn users of known dangers unrelated to third-party posts (Doe v. Internet Brands, 2016). Likewise, in Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, the court held that a platform becomes a developer of unlawful content when its own tools or interface contribute to the harm.  

Extending Section 230 to algorithmic design would push the statute beyond what it was meant to cover. It would allow platforms to avoid accountability for engineering decisions that they alone control. It would also undermine the statute’s underlying policy, which was to encourage moderation and responsible platform management, not to permit companies to build systems that may intensify harmful interactions for minors. Scholars who study Section 230 argue that expanding its reach in this way would transform the statute into a blanket immunity for almost any kind of platform behavior, something Congress did not intend when it wrote the law (2). 

The current lawsuits against Meta and other platforms make this distinction clear. Plaintiffs are not claiming that user content itself is the source of the injury. Instead, they argue that the platform’s architecture, especially engagement-driven design features, created the conditions that caused the harm. These claims focus on decisions made by the company and not on decisions made by users. Because the source of the alleged harm is platform-created design, not third-party speech, Section 230 should not immunize the companies from liability. 

Sources

1. Alter, Adam. 2017. Irresistible: The Rise of Addictive Technology and the Business of Keeping Us Hooked. New York: Penguin Press. 

2. Citron, Danielle K., and Mary Anne Franks. 2020. The Internet as a Speech Machine and Other Myths Confounding Section 230 Reform. https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?amp=&article=1833&context=faculty_scholarship. 

3. Citron, Danielle Keats, and Benjamin Wittes. 2017. “The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity.” Fordham Law Review 86 (2). https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol86/iss2/3/. 

4. Congress.gov. 2026. “Section 230: An Overview.” February 17, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46751. 

5. Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc. 2016. 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir.). Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., No. 12-56638 (9th Cir. 2014) :: Justia 

6. Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc. 2019. 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir.). Dyroff v. The Ultimate Software Group, No. 18-15175 (9th Cir. 2019) :: Justia 

7. “Experts Discuss Ramifications of Court Cases Addressing Social Media Addiction in Children.” 2026. Virginia Tech News, February 13, 2026. https://news.vt.edu/articles/2026/02/Meta-YouTube-youth-children-social-media-addiction-trial-case-experts.html. 

8. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC. 2012. 666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir.). https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2012/02/02/09-55272.pdf. 

9. Fogg, B. J. 2003. Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to Change What We Think and Do. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann. 

10. Fogg, B. J. 2009. “A Behavior Model for Persuasive Design.” In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Persuasive Technology, 1–7. New York: ACM. 

11. Force v. Facebook, Inc. 2019. Appendix to Application for Extension of Time to File Petition for Writ of Certiorari, No. 19-859 (U.S. Supreme Court, November 6, 2019). https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-859/121682/20191106191715669_ForceApplicOpinions.pdf. 

12. Grabenstein, Hannah. 2026. “What Legal Experts Say about a Major ‘Bellwether Trial’ over Child Social Media Addiction.” PBS NewsHour, January 28, 2026. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/what-to-know-about-a-trial-that-will-test-tech-giants-liability-for-child-social-media-addiction. 

13. Harvard Law Review. 2024. “Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc.” Harvard Law Review 137 (5): 1499–1506. Access article 

14. Hassell v. [Respondent], No. 18-506 (U.S. Supreme Court January 4, 2019). Reply Brief in Support of Petition. https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-506/78369/20190104160222952_Hassell%20Reply%20Brief%20in%20Support%20of%20Petition.pdf. 

15. Henderson v. Source for Public Data, L.P. 2022. 53 F.4th 110 (4th Cir.). Tyrone Henderson, Sr. v. The Source for Public Data, L.P., No. 21-1678 (4th Cir. 2022) :: Justia 

16. Kosseff, Jeff. 2019. The Twenty-Six Words That Created the Internet. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. https://cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501735783/the-twenty-six-words-that-created-the-internet/. 

17. Kuss, Daria J., and Mark D. Griffiths. 2017. “Social Networking Sites and Addiction: Ten Lessons Learned.” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 14 (3): 311. 

18. Montag, Christian, and Sarah Diefenbach. 2018. “Towards Homo Digitalis: Important Research Issues for Psychology and the Neurosciences at the Dawn of the Internet of Things and the Digital Society.” Sustainability 10 (2): 415. 

19. Montag, Christian, et al. 2019. “Smartphone Usage in the 21st Century: Who Is Active on WhatsApp?” BMC Research Notes 12: 1–6. 

20. Richard J. Durbin and Lindsey Graham, “Durbin, Graham Introduce Bill to Sunset Section 230 Immunity for Tech Companies,” press release, March 5, 2020, https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-graham-introduce-bill-to-sunset-section-230-immunity-for-tech-companies-protect-americans-online. 

21. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Civil Division. 2025. November 5, 2025. https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/social-media-lawsuits-kgm-motion-denied.pdf. 

22. Williams, James. 2018. Stand Out of Our Light: Freedom and Resistance in the Attention Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

23. Zeran v. America Online, Inc. 1997. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir.). https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/129/327/621462/.