Nora Turner

May 16, 2026

Introduction

On January 9, 2026, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Bowe v. United States, about a year after the case was granted certiorari [1]. The petitioner, Michael S. Bowe, is serving a sentence of twenty-four years after pleading guilty in 2008 to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and using a firearm in relation to a “crime of violence” [2]. This final charge added a mandatory consecutive ten-year sentence on the previous charges. Two critical changes to federal statute have changed what is considered a “crime of violence,” thereby calling into question the legality and constitutionality of Bowe’s imprisonment. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court determined the case to be vacated and remanded, with Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivering the opinion of the Court in her statement, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, as well as Justice Barrett in part [1]. The decision of this case in favor of Bowe opens a wider discussion of differences between state and federal court systems in sentencing structure, as well as determining the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over particular appellate cases. 

Origins of Bowe v. United States

This case originates in Palm Beach County, Florida, when in 2008, Michael Bowe and three other men conspired to rob an armored vehicle carrying over $500,000. Bowe, brandishing a semiautomatic rifle, shot both the driver of the vehicle and the security guard accompanying him. The four co-conspirators failed to attain any of the cash in the vehicle and Bowe’s accomplices fled in the van they were driving, while Bowe left on foot [3]. Upon arrest, Bowe pled guilty to the three charges mentioned above. In the statute defining the final charge, discharging a firearm in the commission of a “crime of violence,” it is defined that this charge carries a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years. Hobbs Act robbery constituted a crime of violence at this time under the definition given in the statute 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A), also known as the “elements clause” [4]. This clause states that a “crime of violence” is defined as a felony that includes an element of physical force against a person or their property. Hobbs Act robbery is generally defined as “actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or foreign commerce” [5]. The Hobbs Act was originally enacted in 1946 in the effort to combat racketeering, but this is not required to be convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, as in this case [5]. Bowe was ultimately charged with twenty-four years in federal prison. This case was never predicated on whether or not Bowe committed these crimes, that is an indisputable fact. The questions that arose for the Court to answer actually begin with the precedent of past Supreme Court cases, which will be discussed later in this section. 

In 2019, the Supreme Court decided 588 U.S. 445, United States v. Davis, stating that the residual clause, 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(B), was unconstitutionally vague, and therefore no longer permissible as a means of defining a crime of violence [6]. The Court’s decision in case 596 U.S. 845, United States v. Taylor, decided in 2022, held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not meet the standards of a crime of violence under the elements clause, which Bowe was originally charged under [7]. Therefore, neither subsection qualified Bowe’s attempted Hobbs Act robbery as a crime of violence, meaning he could not have brandished and fired a weapon in the perpetration of a crime of violence. With each of these substantive changes to case law working in tandem, if the crime was committed today and Bowe was being sentenced, he would likely not be imprisoned for the ten-year consecutive sentence he is currently serving [8]. Bowe had previously sought postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255 in 2016, where he argued that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, a determination made three years before the Davis case [9]. This claim was rejected, where the District Court reasoned that regardless of the residual clause’s constitutionality, Bowe had been charged under the elements clause, and attempted Hobbs Act robbery was still considered a crime of violence under that statute.  

Upon the release of the decision for the Davis case, Bowe sought to file a new motion for post-conviction relief. However, under §2255(h), he was required to seek permission from the appropriate court of appeals that a new rule, certified by the Supreme Court, would retroactively affect the decision made in his case. While the Eleventh Circuit Court did agree with him that such a rule now existed after the Davis decision, he could not generate a prima facie case that his conviction and sentencing were unconstitutional. This was all due to precedent in the Eleventh Circuit Court that Hobbs Act robbery constituted a “crime of violence” [8]. The Taylor case was then decided in 2022, and Bowe filed again for a second and successive motion with the Eleventh Circuit. This was also rejected as the Davis argument had been presented before, which as stated in 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(1), is grounds for dismissal, and the Taylor case was not considered to affect constitutional rule retroactively [10]. Bowe continued to file motions with the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court, citing how the changes in case law affect the ruling in his case among other reasons, until finally filing a petition for a writ of certiorari. A writ of certiorari essentially states that the filer disagrees with the conduct of the lower court, and asks the Supreme Court to review their case as a result [11]. The Supreme Court can grant a writ of certiorari for a variety of reasons, but in this case, it was to harmonize decisions made by various Circuit courts, as six Circuits apply §2244(b)(1) to federal prisoners, and three do not [8]. 

Supreme Court Decision

Statutory clarity plays a major role in the litigation and decision of this case. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, and defined how the Court came to the decision to vacate and remand this case. Vacating a decision means the previous judgment is no longer considered valid [12], while remanding means the case is returned to the lower courts for new judgment [13]. First, the Government attempts to argue that the Court does not have jurisdiction over this case due to clause §2244(b)(3)(E), “denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application… shall not be the subject of a petition for… a writ of certiorari” [8]. There is one critical word in this statute that unravels the Government’s argument, and that is “application.” State prisoners file applications to the court, while federal prisoners file motions, and this statute has no clear indication prohibiting the Court from reviewing motions filed by federal prisoners. Federal prisoners are required to satisfy one of the subclauses under §2255(h), and Bowe’s case seemingly satisfies §2255(h)(2), which states, “[a] second or successive motion must be certified… to contain… a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable” [8]. As Congress has not clearly limited the Court’s jurisdiction over this case in legal statute, the Supreme Court therefore has jurisdiction by default, and since Bowe’s case satisfies the above statement, his case is available for review by the Supreme Court. Based on this information, the majority of the Court has decided that the case is to be vacated and remanded, thus sent back to the lower court for retrial. 

In writing for the dissenting opinion of the Court, Justice Neil Gorsuch breaks down each aspect of the case and describes the flaws he has interpreted from his colleagues’ findings [14]. Firstly, Gorsuch includes the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which reformed habeas corpus petitions as codified in §2255 [15]. This included the restriction that provides that a second or successive challenge must be approved by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals, as defined in §2244. The dissent argues that this includes all of §2244 in the cross-reference, while the opinion agrees with Bowe that the final subsection (E) is not included due to specific terminology present in the statute. Therefore, if subsection (E) is included in the cross-reference, under their argument, then the Supreme Court holds no jurisdiction over this case, as §2244 states, “The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or a writ of certiorari” [10]. It is critical to mention here that the dissent neglects to include the term “application,” instead replacing it with “collateral attack” [14] to apply this to both state and federal prisoners. The use of the term “collateral attack” negates the majority’s opinion that the specific use of “application” denotes this statute only applies to state prisoners. The opinion of the Court rebukes this adjustment, as it believes the term “application” plays a critical role in understanding the full implications of the statute in delineating between state and federal prisoners. 

Next, the dissent contends that §2244(b)(1)’s bar on repeat claims for both state and federal prisoners certifies the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to refuse certification of Bowe’s motion [14]. Gorsuch admonishes the majority opinion’s claim that this statute does not apply to federal prisoners due to the specific use of the word “application” [10], as shown when he states, “[the majority] hold that federal prisoners like [Bowe] are free to file in district court as many do-over claims as they please” [14]. Section 2244(b)(3)(C) does allow the court to certify a second or successive application, again specifically an application, if they determine the filing makes a prima facie showing that it satisfies the requirements of “this subsection” [10], which the dissent interprets to include all of subsection (b) of §2244. The Eleventh Circuit did not accept that Bowe’s motion met the requirements for this prima facie case, another decision the dissent supports. Overall, these arguments and more develop the dissenting opinion’s larger argument against the ruling in Bowe’s favor. 

Long-term Implications for Case Law and Habeas Corpus Filings by Federal Prisoners

Possibly the greatest implication based on the outcome of this case is a major shift in case law, specifically habeas corpus petitions in federal court, thereby furthering the divide between the state and federal systems. As stated in the dissenting opinion, previous Supreme Court cases have applied §2244 to federal prisoners [14], therefore the ruling in favor of Bowe opens up a major change in habeas corpus filings for federal prisoners and further differentiates state versus federal cases. Ultimately, Bowe itself does not create major changes in habeas litigation, however, this decision opens up avenues for federal defendants to argue on the inclusion or exclusion of certain statutes in federal arguments. Richard Cooke is a former Assistant United States Attorney for the State of Virginia and worked with the Department of Justice for 23 years [16]. Now writing for SCOTUSblog, he points out one possible example of the implications of Bowe in later litigation when he states, “[f]or example, parties may dispute whether the court left in place the bar on en banc review in Section 2244(b)(3)(E) for federal inmates” [17]. He also mentions that it is unclear at this time whether this decision will help Bowe in receiving relief of his sentence upon the remand of his case [17]. It will take time to see any lasting effects of the Bowe decision on federal case law and habeas corpus filings, and if so, how those effects will be utilized in arguments. 

Conclusion

The Bowe decision has created the most recent evolution in habeas corpus statute and the legal delineation between state and federal prisoners. Both the opinion of the court and the dissent provide powerful arguments on how the law applies in this context, and the split decision highlights the variations in interpretation based on ideology. The majority opinion’s decision to not apply §2244 to federal prisoners breaks legal precedent and provides a new method for federal prisoners to petition the court for the alleviation of their sentence. This new interpretation on the application of §2244 and other legal statutes also creates the larger question of other legal distinctions between federal and state prisoners. Overall, the decision in the Bowe case could have long-standing implications surrounding jurisdiction in state cases compared to federal, as well as in differentiating sentencing in these criminal structures. Only time will tell the true extent of Bowe’s effects on the justice system, but commentators are already pondering this case’s ramifications.

Sources

[1]”Bowe v. United States.” Oyez. Accessed February 19, 2026. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2025/24-5438. 

[2] Bowe v. United States (Supreme Court of the United States January 9, 2026) (Syllabus). 

[3] Cooke, Richard. “Court Delves Back into the Complicated World of Habeas.” SCOTUSblog, October 10, 2025. https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/10/court-delves-back-into-the-complicated-world-of-habeas/.  

[4] 18 U. S. C. § 924 (2025). 

[5] “2402. Hobbs Act — Generally.” Justice Manual | 2402. Hobbs Act — Generally | United States Department of Justice, January 17, 2020. https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2402-hobbs-act-generally.  

[6] United States v. Davis (Supreme Court of the United States June 24, 2019). 

[7] United States v. Taylor (Supreme Court of the United States December 7, 2021). 

[8] Bowe v. United States (United States Reports January 9, 2026). (Opinion).

[9] 28 U.S. Code § 2255 (2024).

[10] 28 U.S. Code § 2244 (2024). 

[11] “Supreme Court Procedures.” United States Courts. Accessed February 18, 2026. https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-court-procedures. 

[12] “Vacate.” Legal Information Institute, July 2024. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/vacate. 

[13] “Remand.” Legal Information Institute, June 2024. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/remand.    

[14] Bowe v. United States (United States Reports January 9, 2026) (Dissenting).

[15] Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 § (1996). 

[16] “Richard Cooke.” SCOTUSblog. Accessed April 4, 2026. https://www.scotusblog.com/author/rcooke/. [17] Cooke, Richard. “Bare Court Majority Sides with Federal Inmate on Questions of Habeas Procedure.” SCOTUSblog, January 14, 2026. https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/01/bare-court-majority-sides-with-federal-inmate-on-questions-of-habeas-procedure/.